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INTRODUCTION 
Every firm whose profits depend upon the use of confidential 
business information runs the risk of incurring serious losses if such 
information were to be acquired and used without authorization by 
another firm.1 In recent years, the likelihood that such losses will 
occur has greatly increased due to a rise in both industrial espio­
nage2 and employee mobility. Industrial espionage, always in vogue, 
1. As one commentator has noted: 
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION today is so acute in many instances that very often 
a few pennies in the selling price of a product or service, or its quality or lack 
of it, one way or the other, spells success or failure in the sale of that product 
or service. Frequently the price or quality of such product or service is de­
termined by information gained through painstaking effort on the part of a 
company, by its so-called "know how," by equipment refinements, by new 
invention and processing methods, and by other means all of which are to a 
greater or lesser degree kept from the inquisitive eye of competitors and 
others not directly concerned with the operation. 
Maruchnics, Industrial Trade Secrets, Their Use and Prqtection, 4 CLEV.-MAR. L. 
REV. 69, 69 (1955). See also Cranzeier, Guarding Against Industrial Espionage, 53 
MANAGEMENT REV. 40, 41 (Jan. 1974) ("In the V.S. free-enterprise system, research 
secrets have become the handle to industrial power, and the company that doesn't 
have any secrets to protect really isn't in the business of competing."); Bender, Trade 
Secret Protection of Software, 38 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 909, 912 (1970) (research 
secrets are the sine qua non of market power). 
2. "Industrial espionage is the practice of engaging in surreptitious surveillance 
for the purpose of discovering a businessman's secrets." Comment, Industrial Espio­
nage: Piracy of Secret and Technical Information, 14 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 911, 911 
(1967); Perham, The Great Game of Corporate Espionage, 95-96 DUN'S REV. 30 (Oct. 
1970). Although some observers have written that the industrial espionage threat is not 
substantial, see, e.g., Furasch, Problems in Review-Industrial Espionage, 37 HARV. 
Bus. REV. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1959), it seems quite clear that it does pose serious problems 
for the business community. See, e.g., BRENTON, PRIVACY INVADERS, 139-50 (1965); 
Bartenstein, Research Espionage: A Threat To Our National Security, 17 FOOD, 
DRUG, COSMo L.J. 813 (1962); Industrial Spying Goes Big League, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 6, 
1962, at 64; and see generally Hearings on S.928 before the Subcomm. on Administra­
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the judician}, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. 2, 551 (1967). A recent study has concluded that younger executives, as 
compared with older executives, would authorize the carrying out of some highly 
questionable information gathering schemes. Wall, What The Competition is Doing: 
Your Need to Know, 52 HARV. Bus. REV. 22, 23 (Nov.-Dec. 1959). 
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is now easier than ever due to advanced electronic surveillance 
equipment which dispenses with the need to be physically present 
upon a firm's premises. 3 Paralleling the growth of industrial espio­
nage is the increased frequency with which key executives and tech­
nicians change jobs, taking with them confidential information that 
they acquired during their previous employment. 4 These employees 
often do not hesitate to pass on their former employer's confidential 
information because their sense of loyalty appears to run entirely in 
favor of the new employer. Loyalty to the former employer appears 
to evaporate when the job comes to an end. 5 One observer has 
estimated that as a result of these developments, firms now appro­
priate four billion dollars worth of confidential information each year 
from competing businesses. 6 
The owner of valuable confidential information has traditionally 
had two means of guarding such information: obtaining a patent 
under the Patent Act7 or keeping the information secret and relying 
3. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 365 (1967); Comment, Corporate 
Privacy: A Remedy for The Victim of Industrial Espionage, 1971 DUKE L.J. 391, 
395-96. In this regard, one estimate asserted that approximately $300 million is spent 
on industrial espionage devices. Hunting Industry Spies, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 1, 1966, at 
64. Though dated, this estimate would clearly appear to be the minimum figure spent 
in recent years, with the total greatly exceeding it. 
4. See, e.g., Note, Trade Secret Protection of Non-Technical Competitive In­
formation, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1164, 1166-67 (1969); Developments in the Law-Com­
petitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 950 (1964). In a survey conducted by the Har­
vard Business School of readers of The Harvard Business Review, 78% of those 
surveyed said they would give to their new employers all of their information about 
their former employer and 45% said they would hire as a new employee one who 
previously worked for a competitor for the sole purpose of gaining information about 
that firm. Furasch, Problems in Review-Industrial Espionage, 37 HARV. Bus. REV. 6, 
164, 168 (Nov.-Dec. 1959). 
5. Harding, Trade Secrets and The Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAW. 395, 396 
(1967). One court has gone so far as to characterize the former employee who departs 
with confidential information as the "most exasperating of all competitors." Belmont 
Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 103 F.2d 538, 542 (3d Cir. 1939). 
6. The increasing need for firms to remain competitive with other businesses 
and keep abreast of technological developments and innovations, and the expense 
thereof, are generally asserted as the reasons businesses resort to industrial espionage 
rather than develop such information themselves. See, e.g., Comment, Corporate Pri­
vacy: A Remedy for The Victim of Industrial Espionage, 1971 DUKE L.J. 391, 394-95; 
Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Informa­
tion, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 911, 912-13 (1967); Note, Industrial Espionage-Nebraska's 
New Felony, 45 NEB. L. REV. 644, 645 (1966). 
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970). The grant of a patent is the "grant of a statutory 
monopoly," Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,229 (1964), which gives 
the patentee the right, limited to a term of 14 or 17 years, to exclude others from the 
use of his patented item for during that time no one can make, use, or sell the patented 
item without the patentee's'authority. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173,271 (1970). 
" 
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on the common law of trade secrets which, under certain circum­
stances, protects a firm's valuable business information not patented 
or patentable against unauthorized commercial use by others.8 
However, the availability of patent protection is limited. To obtain a 
patent, one must make a threshold showing that the confidential 
information is patentable subject matter. 9 After this initial require­
ment is met, proof of originality,IO novelty,11 utility,12 and non­
obviousness13 must be presented. Finally, the patent applicant 
must comply with a host of procedural requirements. 14 Even when a 
patent can be obtained this form of protection may not make good 
business sense when compared with reliance on trade secret law. In 
the first place, the patent application requires full disclosure of all 
the essential features of the item for which protection is sought. 15 
8. R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 8.02(1) (1977); S. OPPENHEIM & C. WESTON, 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES & CONSUMER PROTECTION 317 (1974) [hereinafter cited 
as OPPENHEIM & WESTON]. See generally Note, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 
50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 536 (1968). Unlike patent protection, 
[t]rade secret protection is theoretically perpetual in duration but the actual 
length of protection depends upon success in keeping it secret, and it is 
subject to being lost by independent discovery or other fair means of obtain­
ing the secret, or because the owner otherwise cannot hold another liable for 
the disclosure or use of a trade secret in numerous situations. 
OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra at 318. One commentator has cited these examples of 
longevity: H[F]ormulas for the mixing of ingredients for cymbals (336 years in the 
Zildjian family) or aromatic bitters (Angostura-Wupperman) or Eau de Cologne ('No. 
4711' made by generations of the Muelhens family in Cologne) or Smith Brother's 
Black Cough Drops (said to be over 100 years old)." Klein, The Technical Trade Secret 
Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 437, 438 (1960). Added to this list should 
be the formula for Coca-Cola which has never been duplicated. See TIME, Aug. 22, 
1977, at 44. As to the possibility of securing protection under the Copyright Act, 17 
U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970), see H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW passim (3d ed. 1952); 
Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 976, 985 (1951). Suffice it to say that it is highly improbable 
that confidential business information would be afforded copyright protection. Com­
ment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 
14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 911, 924-25 (1967). 
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). Thus, for example, in In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 
327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942), an applicant was denied a patent on the ground that Ha system 
of transacting business, apart from the means for carrying out such system, is not 
within the purview of [35 U.S.C. § 101], nor is an abstract idea or theory, regardless of 
its importance or the ingenuity with which it is conceived ... patentable subject 
matter." 
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115 (1970). 
11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1970). 
12. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). 
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). 
14. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE 
PROCESS 640 (1972). 
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-114 (1970). See also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards 
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This requirement may be particularly damaging because the 
patented matter is deemed dedicated to the public when the patent 
expires. is In contrast, trade secret protection is theoretically per­
petual. 17 Second, patent infringement suits are costly18 and it is 
generally recognized that these suits frequently end with declaration 
of patent invalidity. 19 Trade secret plaintiffs are more often success­
ful. 20 Finally, the Supreme Court has held that a licensee of a patent 
who successfully challenges the validity of his licensor's patent is not 
liable for contract royalties, even if the subject of the patent was 
secret at the time of the contracting. 21 On the other hand, the case 
law seems clear in upholding the rights of a licensor of a trade secret 
to the bargained for royalty despite the fact that the subject matter 
of the trade secret has become public knowledge. 22 Consequently, 
more and more firms are opting for trade secret law in order to 
protect their confidential information. 23 
Thus, it appears that more and more lawyers previously un­
familiar with trade secrets will come into contact with this body of 
Phannacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1971); National Theatre Supply Co. v. Da-Lite 
Screen Co., 86 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1936); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway 
Corp., 357 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. III. 1973). 
16. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,119-20 (1938); Singer Mfg. 
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). 
17. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 8.02(1). 
18. Note, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 536, 540 
(1968). 
19. Approximately 72% of the patents whose validity is raised in the courts of 
appeals are held invalid. [1973] PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. No. 120 at A-2 (BNA) 
(remarks of Sen. Phillip Hart on introducing Patent Refonn Act of 1973). It should be 
noted, however, that fewer than 1% of the patents issued each year are challenged. 
Patent Office Study of Court Determinations ofValidity/Invalidity, 1968-1972, [1973] 
PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. No. 144 at F-l (BNA). See also Sprowl, Seventh Circuit 
Review-Patent Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 527 (1974). 
20. One commentator has concluded from a study that in trade secret cases 
plaintiffs were successfuJ 47% of the time. Vandervoort, Trade Secrets: Protecting A 
Very Special "Property," 26 Bus. LAW 681, 683 (1971). 
21. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). See generally Arnold & Goldstein, 
Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1235 (1970). 
22. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Phannaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 
F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd pel' curiam,?30 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960); Sinclair v. 
Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 227, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 661 (1974). See 
also A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); Bolt Assoc. 
v. Alpine Geophysical Assoc., 244 F. Supp. 458, 463 (D.N.J. 1965), order vacated and 
case remanded, 365 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1966). But see Choisser Research Corp. v. 
Electronic Vision Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. 234 (BNA) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972). See generally 
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton; of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 17 
(1971). 
23. Address of Roger Milgrim before the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Sec­
tion of the American Bar Association (August 8, 1977). 
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law. Although many states have enacted statutes which make it a 
crime to appropriate trade secrets,24 and certain federal statutes, 
such as the National Stolen Property Act,25 the Mail Fraud Stat­
ute,26 the Federal Communications Fraud Statute,27 and section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act28 may sometimes be employed 
against trade secret theft, the practitioner will in most cases be 
retained to bring or defend a civil action involving the alleged mis­
appropriation of trade secrets. This article endeavors to provide the 
basic background needed by the practitioner to handle such a law­
suit. After a discussion of the basis of th~ action, the elements 
necessary to establish liability for trade secret misappropriation will 
be reviewed in order to assist the practitioner in determining 
whether the facts of a particular case are sufficient to establish liabil­
ity. Discussion will then focus upon the relief available once liability 
has been established. This article does not seek to reconcile the 
apparent inconsistencies in the cases,29 nor does it attempt to high­
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499(c) (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 18-4-408 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1809 (West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 
§§ 15-1 to 9 (Smith-Hurd 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A, §§ 351-362 (West Supp. 1977); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30(4) (West 1970); MICH COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§§ 752.711-.773 (Supp. 1977-78); MINN. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 609.52 (West Supp. 1977); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 637:1-11 (1974); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:119-5.1-.5 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-16-23 (1972); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00, 155.30 & 165.07 (McKinney 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1331.51 (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (West Supp. 1976-77); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3930 (Purdon 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4238 to 4240 
(1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 31.05 (Vernon 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 
(West Supp. 1977-78). 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970), discussed in Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on 
Criminal Laws Relating to the Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 Bus. LAW. 1535 (1970); 
Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the Protection of Know-How, 20 
BUFFALO L. REV. 119, 123-26 (1970); Sutton, Trade Secrets Legislation, 9 IDEA 587 
(1965). See also United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
974 (1966). 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), discussed in OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 
8, at 315. 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), discussed in OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 
8, at 315. 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), discussed in Klein, supra note 8, 
at 457-59; Comment, Industrial Espionage, supra note 8, at 921-23. 
29. For such a discussion, see 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETI­
TION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 51-59 (3d ed. 1968); R. ELLIS, TRADE SE­
CRETS (1953); R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.01; 1 H. NIMS, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COM­
PETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 141-161a (1947). See also A. TURNER, TRADE SECRETS 
(1962). For an exhaustive bibliography of trade secret literature as of 1959, see 
Rossman, Note on Trade Secrets, 3 PAT. T.M. COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUC. 
211 (1959). 
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light all the pitfalls of trade secret litigation. 3o Rather, its purpose is 
to assist counsel's educational efforts by providing a foundation for a 
. more detailed analysis of the facts in a given case. 
1. BASIS OF THE LAw OF TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 
Peabody v. Norfolpl is frequently cited as the seminal case for 
much of the development of trade secrets law in the United States. 32 
In Peabody, the plaintiff had invented new machinery and a new 
manufacturing process. He hired the defendant as his machinist. In 
the employment contract defendant agreed not to disclose knowl­
edge he might gain concerning the machinery and process. Some 
two years later, defendant quit his job with plaintiff and, in violation 
of his agreement, communicated the information he had acquired to 
others. In addition, he began to build machines like those of his 
former employer. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from dis­
closing the secret. Granting the injunction, the court reasoned that 
one who: 
[I]nvents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, 
whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an 
exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in 
good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a property in it, 
which a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation 
of contract and breach of conndence undertakes to apply it to his 
own use, or to disclose it to third persons. 33 
Although the court's decision seemed to rest primarily on the theory 
that the trade secret was a property right of the plaintiff which 
would be infringed by defendant's disclosure, it also relied on 
theories of breach of contract and breach of confidence. 34 
Subsequent cases have invoked all of the bases mentioned in 
Peabody to provide a remedy to one whose confidential information 
30. See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, Trial Tactics Trade Secret Cases, TRADE SECRETS 
TODAY (P.L.1. 1971); Doyle and Joslyn, The Role of Counsel in Litigation InvolVing 
Technologically Complex Trade Secrets, 6 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 743 (1965). 
31. 98 Mass. 452 (1868). For a discussion of the antecedents of trade secret law 
see Klein, supra note 8, at 437-40 (English common law); Schiller, Trade Secrets and 
the Roman Law: The Actio Semi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 837 (1930) (Roman 
law). 
32. Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 660, 661 (8th Cir. 1944); Herold v. Herold 
China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 9Il, 913 (6th Cir. 1919); Associated Press v. International 
News Serv., 245 F. 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1917), afI'd, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See also E. 
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at 368. 
33. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868). 
34. [d. 
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has been used without authorization. 35 No single theory has been 
universally embraced. 36 As recently as 1939, one commentator ob­
served that the American law of trade secrets had still not "yet 
crystallized around any particular pattern. "37 To Mr. Justice 
Holmes, however, resolution of the issue of what theory should be 
relied upon was easy: 
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is 
an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of 
the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary require­
ments of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable 
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, 
through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may 
be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting 
point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, 
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the 
plaintiffs, or one of them. 38 
This violation of trust theory has been widely accepted in recent 
years by the courts. 39 It dispenses with the need to establish the 
existence of a contract or show that the plaintiff has a property right 
in the matter for which protection is sought. Using this theory, 
courts employ a fairness test, asking simply whether use or disclo­
35. See, e.g, H.B. Wiggins Sons' Co. v. Cott-A-Lap Co., 169 F. 150 (C.C.D. 
Conn. 1909) (implied contract); Roystone v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Inst., 
67 Misc. 265, 266, 122 N.Y.S. 444, 445 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (confidential relationship); 
Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (1887) (property 
right); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86, 86 A. 688, 691 (1913) 
(property right). 
36. Marcuse, The Protection of Trade Secrets: Theory and Practice, 36 CONN. B. 
J. 348, 351 (1962); Note, Nature of Trade Secrets and Their Protection, 42 HARV. L. 
REV. 254 (1928). 
37. Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CrN. L. REV. 507, 558 
( 1939). 
38.. E.1. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). 
39. Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 
1966) ("In general, the essence of the wrong is the obtaining of unjust enrichment and 
unfair competitive advantage through inequitable conduct, usually a breach of confi­
dence."); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953) ("The essence of ... 
[plaintiffs'] action is not infringement [of a property right], but breach of faith."); 
Junker v. Pl;"mmer, 320 Mass. 76,80,67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946) ("Relief is granted to 
protect the secret only where one is attempting to use or disclose it in violation of 
some general duty of good faith such as a breach of contract or abuse of confidence."); 
Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 551, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141, app. denied, 
270 App. Div. 921, 62 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1946) ("Protection is afforded ... against anyone 
who has obtained the secret process by fraud or bad faith."). See also RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS § 757, Comment a (1939); R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 5 (1953); T. ARNOLD, 
Problems ill Trade Secret Law, 1961-62 ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 
SECTION, PROCEEDINGS 248, 251-52. 
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sure by others would be inequitable. To answer this question, the 
factfinder must focus upon the wrongfulness or unfairness of the 
means by which the confidential information was obtained. 40 Such a 
theory of protection has been justified on two grounds. First, it 
encourages future research and development. Second, it helps to 
maintain proper standards of commercial ethics. 41 
Trade secret law, it must be noted, provides only such protec­
tion as is necessary· to promote these policies. Others are free to 
obtain precisely the same information and to use it so long as they 
acquire it through fair and honest means, such as their own inde­
pendent efforts, reverse engineering from the finished product to 
discover ingredients or production methods, or from inadvertent or 
intentional disclosure by the trade secret owner. 42 
II. ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY 

FOR TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 

Although no single formulation for imputing liability for trade se­
cret misappropriation has been universally accepted, the courts are 
in general agreement that liability requires proof of three essential 
elements: (A) The existence of a trade secret; (B) the acquisition of 
the secret by a third party by improper conduct or unfair means; and 
(C) the use or disclosure (or imminence of use or disclosure) by that 
person of the trade secret to the trade secret owner's detriment. 43 
40. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888,948-49 
(1964); Comment, Corporate Privacy, supra note 3, at 403. See also Seismograph SeIV. 
Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342, 354 (E.D. La. 1955) ("No single test 
can be applied in all cases where improper acquisition of business information is 
charged. The inventiveness of the devious mind staggers the imagination. It is simply 
the difference between right and wrong, honesty and dishonesty, which is the 
touchstone in an issue of this kind."). For a discussion of the theory of protection in 
European countries, see Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 507 (1939); Trade Secrets, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 324 (1966). 
41. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); National Tube Co. v. 
Eastern Tube Co., 13 Ohio C.C. Dec. 468 (1902), aff'd, 69 Ohio St. 560, 70 N.E. 1127 
(1903); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960). See also Water SeIVs., 
Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969). 
42. E.1. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5thCir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 
216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974); Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 Wis. 668, 223 N.W.2d 536 
(1974). Cf. K & G Oil Tool & SeIV. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool SeIV., 158 Tex. 594, 314 
S.W.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) (the proper means of gaining possession 
is through inspection and analysis of the product in order to create a duplicate). See 
generally 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 53.3(a); I H. NIMS, supra note 29, § 148. 
43. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.07(1); RESTATMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
See, e.g., Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. Fla. 
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A. What Constitutes a Trade Secret 
The definition of a trade secret most widely followed by the 
courts44 is that set forth in the Restatement of Torts, which provides 
that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or 
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over compet­
itors who do not know or use it. "45 Accordingly, in order to establish 
a trade secret, plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that: (1) the 
item or object he or she alleges to be a trade secret is subject matter 
that will be protected as a trade secret; (2) it is not a matter of com­
mon knowledge in the trade; (3) reasonable precautions have been 
taken to maintain secrecy; and (4) it is of some value to plaintiff. 46 
1. Protectible Subject Matter 
Consistent with the Restatement's definition,47 almost any 
item, knowledge, or information used in the conduct of one's busi­
ness may be held by its possessor as a trade secret. 48 Thus, the 
1972), afI'd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975); Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F . 
.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 
Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d lO2 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afI'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 960, 226 
N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1962), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d 679, 235 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1963); Lowndes 
Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972). 
44. Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 
(1974); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cerl. 
denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. RE. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 
208 A.2d 74 (1965), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Cramp­
ton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921 (1972); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 
50 Misc. 2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, modified, 52 Misc. 2d 197,274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. 
Ct. 1966); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cerl. denied, 358 
U.S. 898 (1958). See also R MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 2.01 (citing cases); Harding, 
Trade Secrets and the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAw. 395, 398 (1967) ("every court 
applies the well-known Restatement definition"). 
45. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). 
46. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974); R 
MILGRIM, supra note 8, §§ 2.01-.08; E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROP­
ERTY LAW PRIMER 117-51 (1975). Cj. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. 
Supp. 202 (E.D. Wisc. 1969), afI'd in substance, rev'd on award of attorneys' fees sub 
nom. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971) (consideration of 
six factors which, upon analysis, are equivalent to the four factors noted in text). 
47. The RESTATEMENT itself provides: "[Trade secrets] may be a formula for a 
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a 
pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ 757, Comment b (1939). 
48. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 222 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, 
J.); International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907 (D. Del. 
1951), afi'd, 248 F.2d 696 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); 2 R 
CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 52; OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 8, at 300; 2 
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technology used in production, such as plans, formulae, specifi­
cations, and general "know-how," is considered to be protectible 
trade secret subject matter,49 as is the machinery itself. 50 Similarly, 
non-technological business information such as customer lists,51 raw 
material sources,52 pricing and cost codes,53 methods of doing busi­
ness,54 and market research studies55 may be protected as trade 
secrets. 56 So broad is the definition that only two important types of 
subject matter cannot be maintained as trade secrets: abstract ideas 
or general principles which are not embodied in a specific form, 57 
and information used in a business which is nevertheless considered 
to belong to the firm's employees. 58 These exceptions are eminently 
sensible, the former owing to the difficulties of enforcement,59 the 
latter because otherwise the employees would be unable to change 
employment without leaving their entire professional life and ex­
perience behind. 60 
STORY, EQUITY JURlSPRUDENCE § 1283 (1916). See generally R. MILGRlM, supra note 
8, § 2.09 for an exhaustive collection of the cases discussing specific categories of 
items, information, and knowledge. 
49. Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 168 (D. Conn. 1951), mod­
ified, 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Pressed Steel Car 
Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904); A. TURNER, TRADE SECRETS 
12-13 (1962); Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-How, 7 PAT. T.M. COPYRIGHT J. OF 
RESEARCH & EDUC. 397 (1963). 
50. See, e.g., A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th 
Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935). 
51. E.g., Town & Country House_& Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 
189 A.2d 390 (1963); Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 278 N.E.2d 636, 328 
N.Y.S.2d 423 (1972); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969) (collecting cases). 
52. E.g., Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921· 
(1972); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Assmann, 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N.Y.S. 334 (1918). 
53. E.g., Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891). 
54. E.g., Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Service Systems Corp. v. 
Harriss, 41 App. Div. 2d 20, 341 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1973). 
55. E.g., Western Electroplating Co. v. Henness, 180 Cal. App. 2d 442, 4 Cal. 
Rptr. 434 (1960). 
56. See generally Note, Trade Secret Protection of Non-Technical Competitive 
Information, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1164 (1969). 
57. E.g., Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); 
Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1934). Recovery for the 
wrongful use of one's ideas has, however, been recognized under contract theories. 
See, e.g., Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968). 
58. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 403 
F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Richard M. Krause, Inc. v. Gardner, 99 N.Y.S.2d 592 
(Sup. Ct. 1950); Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 116 N.E. 951 (1917), cert. denied, 245 
U.S. 662 (1917); A. TURNER, supra note 49, at 162-63. 
59. See Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N.Y.S.2d 
210 (1940). 
60. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); and see generally 
Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960). 
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The scope of the latter exception has proven difficult to deter­
mine. 61 While the courts agree that it encompasses the intellectual 
equipment the employee brings to the job as well as skills and 
knowledge that he would equally have acquired had he worked for 
firms competing with his employer,62 no satisfactory standard for 
classifying whether particular knowledge is the employer's trade se­
cret or part of an employee's general competence has emerged from 
the cases. 63 Consequently, any predictability of results seems im­
possible. Each case will turn upon its own facts and a court's reac­
tion to them. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & 
CO.64 illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between knowledge 
which belongs to a firm and that which belongs to its employees. In 
Hutton, three account executives, who specialized in option writing 
and trading, quit plaintiff and joined a competing brokerage firm. 
The original employer sued both the individuals and their new em­
ployer, alleging, inter alia, trade secret misappropriation. Plaintiff 
claimed that the individuals took to their new employment certain 
"option ledgers" which contained information concerning the start­
ing price, expiration date, and profit and loss history of various kinds 
and classes of options. 65 The court rejected plaintiff's trade secret 
claim. It found that the option ledgers were created by the three 
individuals, that plaintiff did not require that such records be kept, 
that the ledgers related to accounts which the individuals them­
selves had personally obtained rather than accounts given to them 
by plaintiff, that account executives customarily made photocopies of 
such records for themselves when they changed employment, and 
that the removal of such records was in conformity with industry 
practice. 66 Based upon these findings, the court stated that "it would 
be difficult for this Court to find, with any degree of assurance at 
this stage, that the documents are valuable assets of plaintiff's busi­
61. Note, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324, 
326 (1963); and see generally Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. 
L. REV. 888,950-51 (1964). 
62. See Tempo Instrument, Inc. Y. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (E.D.N.Y. 
1964); Aronson Y. Orloy, 228 Mass. 1, 5, 116 N.E. 951, 953 (1917), cert. denied, 245 
U.S. 662 (1917). 
63. Compare Sperry Rand Corp. y. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964) 
with Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. y. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
64. 403 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mich. 1975). 
65. Id. at 338-39. 
66. Id. at 339-42. 
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ness."67 No criteria were advanced nor competing interests weighed 
to justify this conclusion; the court simply weighed the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
In an attempt to establish workable guidelines, some courts 
have specifically held that if the subject matter of the claimed trade 
secret had been created through the application of the employee's 
own skill, such knowledge then belongs to the employee. 68 In such a 
case, absent an express covenant by the employee not to use or 
disclose such information, or a situation in which the employer has 
assigned the employee the task of developing such information and 
committed company resources to the project, the employee is free 
to use or disclose it in subsequent activity. 69 
Despite the exceptions, a wide variety of business items and 
information can qualify as protectible subject matter. From a practi­
cal standpoint, therefore, it will be the rare case, such as Hutton, 
that will involve information that cannot qualify as matter subject 
to trade secret protection. Dispute as to whether business items or 
information qualifies as a trade secret typically focuses on the other 
elements of plaintiff's case. 
2. Not Common Knowledge 
The fundamental basis for legal protection, as the trade secret 
name suggests, is that the matter be retained in secrecy.70 In other 
words, it "must be the particular secrets of the employer as dis­
tinguished from the general secrets of the trade in which he is 
engaged. "71 Matters which are generally known in the trade or 
business cannot form the basis of a trade secret72 since their misap­
propriation can cause little or no damage. 73 
The determination of whether the matter in question is not 
67. Id. at 341. 
68. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering !'i1echanics Research 
Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); New Method Die & Cut-Out Co. v. 
Milton Bradley Co., 289 Mass. 277, 194 N.E. 80 (1935); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 
569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960), criticized in 74 HARV. L. REV. 1473 (1961). 
69. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 5.02(3). 
70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Stedman, Trade Secrets, 
23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 6 (1962). See generally R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, §§ 2.05-06 
(collecting cases). 
71. Klein, supra note 8, at 441. 
72. See Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198,246 P.2d 11 (1952); 
National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d 
357, appeal dismissed, 274 App. Div. 822, 81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1948). 
73. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796,805 (D. Del. 1920). 
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common knowledge is a question of fact to be answered by the trier 
of fact. 74 The cases have established guidelines to help the factfinder 
make this determination. Claims of secrecy will be defeated by a 
showing that a competitor of the alleged trade secret's owner had 
previously used the matter in question in its business,75 that defen­
dant had already been using the information,76 that the information 
had been widely circulated before the alleged misappropriation, 77 
that the information could be derived from readily available 
sources,78 or that it had been published in a patent grant. 79 More­
over, lack of secrecy may be inferred from the manner in which 
defendants treated the information prior to the litigation. 80 
74. See Kodekey Elecs., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1973); 
see also R. MILGIRM, supra note 8, § 2.03. See Cummings, Some Aspects of Trade 
Secrets and Their Protection: The Public Domain and the "Unified Description" 
Requirement, ';;4 Ky. L.J. 190 (1966) for a discussion of many of the problems in de­
termining whelher the alleged secret is in fact secret. 
I
75. See Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 
1173 (D. Ariz. 1973). 
76. See Chemithon Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 287 F. Supp. 291, 317 (D. 
Md. 1968). 
77. See Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz Cylinder Co., 119 Ill. App. 2d 251,256 N.E.2d 
357 (1969). There is no uniformity in the cases as to how widespread the information 
has to be before it loses its secrecy. 
78. See Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 278 N.E.2d 636, 328 N.Y.S.2d 
423 (1972). The mere fact that the claimed trade secret consists of several components 
each of which by itself is in the public domain does not, however, preclude protection 
so long as the trade secret, as a "unified process," is kept secret. Imperial Chern. 
Indus. Ltd. v. National Distillers and Chern. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965). 
79. See Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp. 516, 524 (E.D. Ill. 1959), 
afrd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); Comment, Trade Secrets After Patent 
Publication: a PUllitive Injunction, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 313 (1963). The mere appli­
cation for a patent, however, does not constitute public disclosure, Sandlin v. Johnson, 
141 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1944); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 
531 (6th Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935), as the Patent Office is required to 
keep the applications confidential. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (Supp. v 1975). As to whether 
an applicant is deemed to have made a public disclosure of an alleged trade secret 
when the Patent Office rejects as unpatentable the application embodying the al­
leged trade secret, compare Brown v. Fowler, 316 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958) 
(subject matter remains as protectible trade secret where mechanical patent rejected, 
but design patent granted) with American Gage & Mfg. Co. v. Maasdam, 245 F.2d 62 
(6th Cir. 1957) (subject matter denied protection as trade secret where the patent 
rejection was premised on the ground that it was fully disclosed by the prior art). See 
also Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. dellied, 422 U.S. 1056 
(1975) (abandoned patent applications are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom 
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, (West 1977); Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic 
Advanced Metals, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. 595 (B.N.A. Mass. Super. Ct. 1971) (where pa­
tent application is withdrawn, subject matter can still be protected as trade secret). 
Under Patent Office regulations, rejected patent applications are retained in con­
fidence. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (1977). 
80. See, e.g., Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic Advanced Metals, Inc. 172 
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It is important to distinguish cases in which the possessor of the 
information has revealed it to another in confidence or under an 
express or implied obligation not to use or disclose it. 81 Such a 
confidential disclosure does not destroy the element of secrecy. 
Thus, protection has been accorded to information that has been 
revealed to prospective purchasers or licensees,82 to information 
disclosed to employees involved in the manufacturing process in 
which it is used,83 and to information disclosed to employees in the 
form of blueprints and drawings. 84 The theory is that commercial 
reality requires such disclosure, for otherwise the information would 
be without practical value. 85 
Similarly, public marketing does not make trade secrets, that 
are incorporated into a product, common knowledge if those secrets 
cannot be discovered by reverse engineering, inspection of the prod­
uct itself, or similar investigatory methods. 86 Thus, even after a prod­
uct is on the market or otherwise placed in the public domain, the 
process by which it is manufactured, engineering benefits or eco­
nomic savings derived from certain of its features, or the nature of 
its constituent elements may still remain the subject of trade secret 
protection. 87 The courts have, however, consistently held that when 
the alleged trade secret is ascertainable by inspection of the product 
the sale constitutes a public disclosure of these trade secrets. 88 
U.S.P.Q. 595 (B.N.A. Mass. Super. Ct. 1971); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. 
Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
81. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(c) (1939); OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra 
note 8, at 300-01. 
82. See Heyman v. A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1963); 
Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir.), Gert. denied, 298 U.S. 
673 (1935). 
83. See Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), Gert. denied, 389 U.S. 
829 (1967). 
84. See Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 
Riteoff, Inc. v. Contact Indus., Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 731, 350 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1973). 
85. 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 53.3. 
86. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, §§ 2.05(2)-.05(3). See, e.g., A.H. Emery Co. 
v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968). Tabor 
v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); K & G Oil Tool & Servo CO. V. G & G 
Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958). 
87. A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), Gert. denied, 
393 U.S. 835 (1968); Weil-McLain CO. V. Andro Corp., [1976-1977] PAT. T.M. & 
COPYRIGHT J. No. 333 at A-16 (BNA) (N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
88. See Juliano V. Hobart Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 453 (D. Mass. 1961), aff'd per 
curiam, 303 F.2d 830 (1st Cir. 1962); Carver V. Harr, 132 N.J. Eq. 207, 27 A.2d 895 
(Ch. 1942); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Even though the 
product would have to be rendered inoperative and examined by a skilled engineer in 
order for the trade secret contained therein to be discovered, this rule prevails. See 
Midland-Ross Corp. V. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1961). 
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Closely related to this point is that once there has been a mis­
appropriation of a trade secret by improper means,89 the fact that 
such information was also available to the public, including the de­
fendant, does not preclude plaintiff from securing relief if he can 
prove the elements of his case. 90 As the court in Franke v. 
Wiltschek 91 pointed out, the determinative question is not whether 
the defendant could have obtained the information from public 
sources, but rather whether in fact he did so obtain it. This principle 
was applied in Smith v. Dravo Corp.92 In Dravo, the plaintiff dis­
closed the design for steel freight containers to defendant, a pro­
spective purchaser of plaintiff's -business. Shortly afterwards, defen­
dant began manufacturing a container of similar design. At the time 
plaintiff made the disclosure to defendant, 100 of plaintiff's contain­
ers were in public use. The court held that the information about 
plaintiffs design acquired by defendant was, nevertheless, protected 
against unauthorized use. "[T]he mere fact that such lawful acquisi­
tion is available," the court observed, "does not mean that [defen­
dant] may, through a breach of confidence, gain the information in 
usable form and escape the efforts of inspection and analysis. "93 In 
several other cases the courts have similarly recognized that the pub­
lic availability of a trade secret does not defeat a claim of trade secret 
misappropriation when the owner of the trade secret has conveyed it 
to another party subject to a contractual duty forbidding its use or 
disclosure. 94 
There are cases, however, that reject the reasoning followed in 
Dravo. 95 The differing views can be attributed to the courts' varying 
opinions as to the appropriate standard of commercial morality. As 
the court stated in Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can CO.96: 
89. See text infra at notes 126-76 for a discussion of what constitutes improper 
means. 
90. See Telex Corp. Y. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 929-30 (10th Cir.), cert. dis­
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889). 
91. 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953). 
92. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953). 
93. Id. at 375. 
94. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis. 
1969), afI'd in substance, rev'd on award of attorney's fees, 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 
1971) (implied from circumstances of business dealings); Sinclair Y. Aquarius Elecs., 
Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974) (license agreement); K & G Oil 
Tool & Servo Co. y. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) (lease). 
95. See Northup y. Reish, 200 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1953); Sandlin y. Johnson, 152 
F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1945); Van Prod. Co. y. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 
248,268,213 A.2d 769, 780 (1965). 
96. 72 N.]. Eq. 387, 395-96, 67 A. 339, 343 (1907). 
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[T]oo much emphasis has perhaps been placed upon the element 
of absolute secrecy in the process, and that not enough stress has 
been laid upon the inequitable character of the defendants' con­
duct in making a use of such process that was inimical to the 
complainant's interests. . . . [T]he secrecy with which a court of 
equity deals is not necessarily that absolute secrecy that inheres in 
discovery, but that qualified secrecy that arises from mutual 
understanding, and that is required alike by good faith and by 
good morals. 97 
Since the tendency of the law has been in the direction of im­
posing higher standards of commercial morality in trade dealings, 98 
most courts seem to favor the principle espoused in Dravo. 99 
3. Reasonable Precautions 
The courts have consistently held that reasonable steps must be 
taken to protect and preserve the secrecy of the subject matter that 
is the alleged trade secret. 100 The theory is that the owner of the 
information, having made no effort to maintain it in secrecy, is in­
dicating that he or she does not consider it to be a trade secret and 
thus the law should not. 101 The degree of secrecy required, how­
ever, is not absolute. 102 Plaintiff need only establish that under the 
circumstances reasonable precautions were employed to ensure that 
the subject matter remained secret. 103 
A recent case that exemplifies this requirement is]. T. Healy & 
Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Sons, Inc. 104 Defendant, James A. 
97. Id. 
98. E.g., Vitro Corp. v. Hall Chern. Co., 254 F.2d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 1958); Seis­
mograph Servo Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342, 354-55 (E.D. La. 
1955). 
99. See, e.g., McKinzie V. Cline, 197 Or. 184,252 P.2d 564 (1953). 
100. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & CO. V. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 
1015-16 (5th Cir. 1970), cer!. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); General Aniline & Film 
Corp. V. Frantz, 50 Misc. 2d 994, 999, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606, modified, 52 Misc. 2d 
197, 274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966); R MILGlUM, supra note 8, § 2.04 (collecting 
cases). 
101. J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 738, 
260 N.E.2d 723, 730-31 (1970); Gallowhur Chern. Corp. V. Schwerdle, 37 N.J. Super. 
385, 117 A.2d 416 (Ch. Div. 1955). 
102. See Space Aero Prod. Co. v. RE. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, 
supplemented, 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 699, cer!. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965). 
103. See Schulenburg V. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), 
cer!. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966); Lowndes Prods., Inc. V. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 331, 
191 S.E.2d 761, 766 (1972); R MILGlUM, supra note 8, § 2.04. Ultimately, this is a 
question for the trier offact to resolve. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471,474 
(9th Cir. 1974). 
104. 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 (1970). 
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Murphy, had worked for the plaintiff, a jewelry findings business, 105 
since 1936. He had served most recently as an officer and director. 
Murphy quit plaintiff's employ to set up a rival business. Sub­
sequently, plaintiff charged him and others with trade secret misap­
propriation. It alleged that defendant was using some of plaintiff's 
jewelry findings processes. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa­
chusetts held that plaintiff had failed to establish that its processes 
were trade secrets because the requirement of reasonable precau­
tions was not met. The court observed that these processes were 
openly used as part of plaintiff's manufacturing processes. No par­
titions were set up to shield them from disclosure. Employees 
were not required to sign a nondisclosure agreement, nor were 
notices posted cautioning workers not to disclose or discuss the 
processes. The court held that these omissions amounted to a "con­
scious" decision not to maintain secrecy. To earn trade secret pro­
tection, an employer must constantly admonish his or her employees 
that processes or ideas are secret and must be kept so. An affirma­
tive program of "constant and reasonable steps" to maintain secrecy 
must be proved, }md "eternal vigilance" to ensure its effectiveness 
must be maintained. While the intent of the program necessarily 
varies from industry to industry and from plant to plant, each em­
ployer must at least give "constant warnings to all persons to whom 
the trade secret has become known and [obtain] from each an 
agreement, preferably in writing, acknowledging its secrecy and 
promising to respect it. To exclude the public from the manufactur­
ing area is not enough. "106 
Similarly, in Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle,107 the court deter­
mined that plaintiff failed to maintain adequate secrecy. In Wheel­
abrator, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin defendant's use of an al­
legedly secret process for making steel shot to be used as an 
abrasive. Plaintiff argued that defendant had agreed in a written 
employment contract to respect plaintiff's trade secrets and that en­
tering into this agreement constituted a reasonable and sufficient 
precaution. The court held that the contract was not controlling on 
this point, noting that defendant was in a relatively weak bargaining . 
position when he executed the contract, and, more importantly, that 
105. Jewelry findings are pieces of metal that are produced by using dies, and 
which are then sold to jewelry manufacturers who finish the pieces. ld. at 731, 260 
N.E.2d at 726-27. 
106. ld. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 731. 
107. 317 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. La. 1970). 
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plaintiff failed to take further adequate security precautions. Al­
though plaintiff had fenced in its manufacturing facilities and estab­
lished guard houses at various entrance points, the court was unim­
pressed. It observed that rather lax "general security management," 
which embraced both secret and nonsecret facilities alike, was not 
by itself a reasonable precaution for purposes of trade secret protec­
tion. More must be shown than compliance with the custom of many 
manufacturers "to exclude the general public from an inspection of 
their methods. "108 The court stressed: 
[Tlhe apparent routine ness that customers, potential customers, 
independent contractors, and repairmen were allowed admission 
to the plant .... [Mlany of the people that were allowed to tour 
the plant were engineers and professionals, some of whom the de­
fendant personally conducted in descriptive tours. Almost all, if not 
all, of the alleged secret processes were visible, and only a few in­
terior modifications to machinery were not observable. Significantly 
there was no evidence of contractual relationships between those 
touring the plant and Wheelabrator. Nor was there evidence of 
admonitions or notice to the independent contractors and repair­
men as to the allegedly confidential nature of the operations. lOS 
For these reasons, among others, the court concluded that plaintiff 
had failed to take reasonable precautions under the circumstances to 
preserve the secrecy of its steel shot manufacturing processes. 
E.I. duPont deNenwurs & Co., Inc. v. Christopher llO stresses 
the point that while precautions must be take~, they need only be 
reasonable. Plaintiff was constructing an addition to a plant which, 
when completed, would manufacture methanol by a secret process. 
Because some of the buildings were unfinished, parts of the process 
were exposed to aerial view. Defendants were charged with flying 
over and photographing the unfinished addition. They argued that 
plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable precautions, should have put 
a roof over the unfinished plant. The court held that failure to con­
struct a roof was not unreasonable in these circumstances. "Reason­
able precautions against predatory eyes we may require," the court 
wrote, "but an impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable require­
"111ment. . 
108. Id. at 638 (quoting Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Williamson Heater Co., 
269 F. 614, 615 (6th Cir. 1920)). 
109. Id. 
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The lessons of these cases seem clear. Plaintiff must establish at 
the very least that he or she pursued some of the following: Restrict­
ing outside visitors from the manufacturer's plant where the alleged 
trade secret is used; limiting access to it only to those who have a 
need to know; maintaining it in a secure location; and advising those 
who have access to it that it is confidential. Whether or not more 
measures will have to be implemented will depend on the circum­
stances. 112 
4. Value 
It is clear that courts will not extend trade secret protection to 
all secret information. Only those secrets which provide a distinct 
competitive advantage over others who are neither aware of nor use 
them will be protected. 113 This advantage constitutes value. 114 Ex­
pressed another way, this element means that the possessor of an 
item for which trade secret protection is sought musfestablish that it 
involves a discovery or an advance in the industry. 115 Value will then 
be inferred. 116 
This requirement suggests an analogy to patent law, which re­
quires for patentability that the elements of novelty, utility, and 
nonobviousness must appear to a person "having ordinary skill in 
the art to which said subject matter pertains. "117 The cases have, 
however, explicitly rejected the application of the patent standard to 
trade secret litigation. us As noted above, the definition of value 
requires some degree of novelty, l:iut the degree required is not as 
great as it is for patent protection. Some novelty is required "if 
merely because that which does not possess novelty is usually 
112. For discussions of trade secret protection programs, see PROBLEMS OF BUSI­
NESS AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY (R. Needham ed. 1971); Harding, Trade Secrets and 
the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAW. 395, 402-04 (1967); Vandervoort, supra note 20, at 
685-88. 
113. See Cudahy Co. v. American Labs, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Neb. 
1970). 
114. Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or. 139, 156, 374 P.2d 912, 920-21 (1962). 
115. See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953); Sinclair v. Aquarius 
Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974). 
116. A. TURNER, supra note 49, at 24. 
117. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970); see notes 10-13 supra. 
118. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); A.O. Smith Corp. v. 
Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 
(1935); cf. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 258 (S.D. Cal. 
1958) (subject matter must be "of a character which does not occur to persons in the 
trade with knowiedge of the state of the art or which cannot be evolved by those 
skilled in the art from the theoretical description of the process, or compilation or 
compendia of information or knowledge"). 
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known, "119 and consequently of no value. 120 
The fact that the alleged trade secret was inexpensive to de­
velop or that it is easily discoverable does not establish that it has no 
value.121 Such a view is eminently sensible. So long as a trade secret 
gives one's business a significant competitive advantage over others 
who do not have it, value should be inferred. Making factors such as 
cost or ease of development determinative would only invite litiga­
tion and result in arbitrary decisions as to how much money estab­
lishes "considerable cost" and what constitutes "ease ofdiscovery. "122 
Several courts require the plaintiff to prove regular use of the 
alleged secret in his or her business as part of the "value" require­
ment. 123 One commentator has observed that this line of cases is 
based upon judicial reluctance to raise "an untested and perhaps un­
implemented idea to the status of a ... [provable] right"124 without 
some evidence indicating that the discoverer has the capacity to put 
119. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). 
120. This does not mean that this element is simple to establish. On the contrary, 
the courts have shown that the parties will still have to meet their requisite burden of 
proof. See, e.g., Nickelson v. General Motors Corp., 361 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1966) 
(claimed trade secret was a trivial advance); Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury 
Food Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Neb. 1974) (value of claimed trade 
secret was insignificant). 
121. International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 
913 (D. Del. 1951) (relief will not be refused simply because plaintiff's trade secret 
might probably be discovered by independent experiment); L. M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. 
Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431, 438 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (court will not speculate whether defen­
dant could have discovered plaintiff's trade secret by examining the "prior art"); 
R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 2.02(2) ("Since it is established that a trade secret can be 
discovered fortu;tously (ergo, without costly development), or result purely from the 
exercise of creative faculties, it would appear inconsistent to consider expense of 
development of a trade secret as an operative substantive element. [footnote omit­
ted]"). 
122. Contra, Manos v. Melton, 358 Mich. 500, 509, 100 N.W.2d 235, 239 (1960), 
criticized in 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324, 336-38 (1963). Although the RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939), singles out the amount of money or effort expended 
as a factor in determining whether a trade secret exists, it does not give controlling 
weight to such a factor. In this regard, it may be said that if a plaintiff can establish 
that its secret information was developed only after considerable time and expense 
such proof may aid the plaintiff's case. Compare Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron 
Battery, Inc., 19 III. App. 3d 299, 316, 311 N.E.2d 386, 400 (1974) (may be of sig­
nificance) with Wildowsky v. Dudek, 30 Conn. Supp. 288, 289, 310 A.2d 766, 767 
(C.P. 1972) (will not help). 
123. E.g., Victor Chern. Works v. Iliff, 299 III. 532, 548, 132 N.E. 806, 812 
(1921); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939); contra, Ferroline Corp. v. 
General Aniline and Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 
U.S. 953 (1954); Smith v. Dravo, 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). The Victor line of 
cases is criticized in OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 8, at 312-13. 
124. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 2.02(1). 
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the idea to use. In addition, the "regular use" requirement helps the 
court to fix the value of the secret for the purpose of awarding 
damages. Although this requirement does not pose any problems 
where the trade secret is being commercially used, it may create a 
problem in the research and development, experimental, or other 
precommercial stages. 125 
B. What Constitutes Acquisition by Improper or Wrongful Means 
Having established the existence of a trade secret, plaintiff must 
then establish that the defendant obtained that trade secret by im­
proper or wrongful means. No complete catalogue of what consti­
tutes such means can be compiled since, as one court has explained, 
" 'Improper' will always be a word of many nuances, determined by 
time, place, and circumstances. "126 Some general guidelines, how­
ever, have been developed. 
It is well established that when one who stands in neither a 
fiduciary nor confidential relationship to the trade secret owner ac­
quires a secret by means that are "independently unlawful," the test 
of improper conduct is satisfied. 127 Among such means are: "theft, 
trespass, bribing or otherwise inducing employees or others to re­
veal the information in breach of duty, fraudulent misrepre­
sentations, threats of harm by unlawful conduct, wiretapping, pro­
curing one's own employees or agents to become employees of the 
other for purposes of espionage.... "128 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently discussed 
and extended the definition of "independently unlawful means" in 
E.I. duPont deNemours v. Christopher. 129 The decision is impor­
tant because of its rationale as well as its result. The court showed 
its willingness to look beyond current case law categories of tortious 
conduct and to base a finding of "unlawfulness" upon a careful 
125. See Englehard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 
353 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964). See generally R. MILGRIM, 
supra note 8, § 2.02. 
126. E.!. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
127. See' Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953); Eastern Extract­
ing Co. v. Greater New York Extracting Co., 126 App. Div. 928, 930-31, 110 N.Y.S. 
738,741 (1908); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 575, 314 S.W.2d 763,769, cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); Developments in the Law---Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. 
L. REV. 888, 949 (1964). 
128. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759, Comment c (1939). 
129. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
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analysis of the challenged conduct and its surrounding circum­
stances. 
In Christopher, the defendants were charged with wrongfully 
obtaining plaintiff's trade secrets and selling them to an undisclosed 
third party. The complaint alleged that the defendants took several 
aerial photographs of one of plaintiff's facilities that was then in an 
unfinished condition, which left parts of plaintiff's secret methanol 
manufacturing process exposed to view from the air. This process, 
plaintiff claimed, was developed after much expensive and time­
consuming research. The complaint further alleged that the process 
gave plaintiff a valuable competitive advantage over other produc­
ers, and was, consequently, a trade secret which it had taken special 
precautions to safeguard. Plaintiff sought damages and an injunction. 
The defendants unsuccessfully moved for dismissal for failure to 
state a claim. 
On appeal,130 the 'defendants argued that they had committed 
no "actionable wrong" either in photographing plaintiff's facility or 
in passing the photographs on to another party because "they con­
ducted all of their activities in public airspace, violated no govern­
ment aviation standard, did not breach any confidential relation, 
and did not engage in any fraudulent or illegal conduct. "131 In sum, 
they argued that misappropriation of trade secrets cannot be action­
able where no violation of an explicit legal prohibition has occurred. 
The Fifth Circuit, in rejecting these arguments, squarely held 
that aerial photography, otherwise lawful, is an improper means of 
obtaining a trade secret. 132 Its rationale was clear: 
One may use his competitor's secret process if he discovers the 
process by reverse engineering applied to the finished product; 
one may use a competitor's process if he discovers it by his own 
independent research; but one may not avoid these labors by 
taking the process from the discoverer without his permission at a . 
time when he is taking reasonable precautions to maintain its 
secrecy. 133 
In other words, one may not obtain knowledge of another's trade 
secret without spending the time and money necessary to discover it 
130. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for an interlocutory appeal 
from the court's ruling that plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief would be 
granted. 
131. 431 F.2d at 1014. 
132. Id. at 1015. 
133. Id. 
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independently, unless the owner voluntarily discloses it or fails to 
take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy. Significantly, the 
court was unpersuaded by defendant's argument that it had only 
followed generally accepted standards of commercial morality. It 
wrote: 
In taking this position we realize that industrial espionage of 
the sort here perpetrated has become a popular sport in some seg­
ments of our industrial community. However, our devotion to 
free wheeling industrial competition must not force us into ac­
cepting the law of the jungle as the standard of morality expected 
in our commercial relations. 134 
The significance of Christopher lies in its expansive and flexible 
definition of what constitutes the acquisition of a trade secret by 
"independently unlawful" means by one who does not stand in a 
fiduciary or contractual relationship to the trade secret's owner. Its 
definition embraces acquisition by any method other than indepen­
dent development, reverse engineering, or disclosure by the owner, 
whether or not that method violates specific legal prohibitions. 
A second situation in which the courts will find a means of 
obtaining trade secrets to be improper, though "far less pemici­
OUS"135 than acquisition by inherently unlawful means, occurs when 
one uses for his or her own purposes a trade secret revealed under 
an obligation not to use it. 136 It is not necessary to show that there 
was an express agreement not to use the trade secret. 137 Rather, 
"[t]he existence of a confidential relationship, arising prior to or 
concurrent with disclosure of a trade secret, imposes an absolute (as 
opposed to relative) duty not to use or disclose the secret."138 
Whether or not such a confidential relationship exists will, in turn, 
depend upon an analysis of the facts and circumstances of each 
individual case. 139 When the facts show that a disclosure was made 
134. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added). The court further added: ''The market place 
must not deviate from our mores." Id. at 1017 (emphasis added). 
135. Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the Protection of 
Know-How, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 119, 136 (1970). 
136. See R. MILGlUM, supra note 8, §§ 4.03, 5.01-.03 (collecting cases); Annat., 9 
A.L.R.3d 665, § 3(a) (1966) (collecting cases). 
137. See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953); Telechron, Inc. 
v. Parissi, 197 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1952); Brown v. Fowler, 316 S.w.2d 111, 114 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1958); 31 CORNELL L.Q. 382 (1946). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396 (1958). 
138. R. MILGlUM, supra note 8, § 4.03 (footnotes omitted). 
139. Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp., 502 F.2d 802, 
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in order to further a particular relationship, confidentiality will be 
implied. 140 The required element of confidentiality has frequently 
been found when disclosures have been made in the context of the 
following business relationships: Manufacturer-independent contrac­
tor;141 manufacturer-distributor;142 supplier-purchaser;143 inventor­
potential manufacturer;144 licensor-licensee;145 and, owner of busi­
ness-potential buyer of business. 146 
Kamin v. Kuhnau 147 illustrates this principle. Plaintiff had de­
signed a garbage truck that compressed trash through the use of a 
hydraulically operated "plow," and thereby increased the truck's 
capacity. The defendant was hired by plaintiff to construct the trucks 
at defendant's facilities, using plaintiff's design. After ten trucks had 
been built, defendant terminated the relationship and began to in­
dependently manufacture and sell garbage trucks, which were very 
similar to those which he had manufactured for plaintiff. Plaintiff 
then sued to enjoin defendant's use of its truck design, contending 
that the design was a trade secret. After determining that plaintiff's 
design was indeed secret, the court addressed the question of 
"whether the disclosure to defendant ... of plaintiff's design for a 
garbage packer unit was made under such circumstances as to raise 
an implication of a promise by Kuhnau not to appropriate the design 
to his own use."148 The court held that the relationship between the 
parties was such that an obligation not to appropriate the design 
808 (9th Cir. 1974); Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 389 (7th CiT. 
1967); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or. 139, 152, 374 P.2d 912, 919 (1962). 
140. Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1967); 
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953); Schreyer v. Casco Prods. 
Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 924 (2d CiT. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952). 
141. McKinzie v. Cline, 197 Or. 184, 191, 252 P.2d 564, 567 (1953). 
142. Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953) (disclosure to defendants 
to assist them in selling plaintiff's product). 
143. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis. 
1969), afI'd in substance, rev'd on award of attorney's fees sub nom. Forest Labs., 
Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971). 
144. William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264 
(W.D. Pa. 1951) (plaintiff exhibited article to defendant for purpose of selling or leas­
ing it to latter). 
145. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 575, 314 S.W.2d 763, 769, cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) (defendant gained knowledge of trade' secret through 
licensing agreement with plaintiff). 
146. See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953) (disclosure to 
defendant for purpose of selling business to it). 
147. 232 Or. 139,374 P.2d 912 (1962). 
148. Id. at 146, 374 P.2d at 916. 
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could be inferred. Since the defendant was paid to assist the plaintiff 
in commercially exploiting the design, the court reasoned that: 
It must have been apparent to Kuhnau that plaintiff was attempt­
ing to produce a unit which could be marketed. Certainly it would 
not have been contemplated that as soon as the packer unit was 
perfected Kuhnau would have the benefit of plaintiff's ideas and 
the perfection of the unit through painstaking and expensive ex­
perimentation. 149 
Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant "violated his 
duty to plaintiff by appropriating the information derived through 
their business relationship. "150 
Similar reasoning was employed in Smith v. Dravo Corp. 151 
In the early 1940's, Leathem Smith had designed and developed 
steel freight containers, called "Safeway Containers." These contain­
ers possessed several novel features which made them very attrac­
tive for use in boat and rail shipping. The defendant corporation 
became interested in the containers after learning how success­
ful they were. It approached Smith's company seeking to purchase 
the containers. During the course of these negotiations, Mr. Smith 
died and his heirs decided to sell the container business. Defendant 
expressed an interest in such a purchase. Consequently, a represen­
tative of Smith's company sent detailed information to defendant 
concerning the container's designs, plans, and prospective custom­
ers. The negotiations ultimately broke off. Shortly thereafter, defen­
dant began to manufacture containers adopting many, if not all, of 
the features of plaintiff's -design. Plaintiff then brought an action for 
trade secret misappropriation alleging that defendant had obtained 
knowledge of plaintiff's trade secrets through a confidential relation­
ship and then wrongfully violated that confidentiality by using the 
secrets to its advantage. After rejecting the argument that no trade 
secrets were involved, the court considered whether defendant had 
149. [d. at 142-53,374 P.2d at 919. 
150. [d. at 155, 374 P.2d at 920. To further support its holding, the court wrote: 
Ifour system of private enterprise on which our nation has thrived, prospered 
and grown great is to survive, fair dealing, honesty and good faith between 
contracting parties must be zealously maintained; therefore, if one who has 
learned of another's invention through contractual relationship, such as exists 
in the present case, takes unconscionable and inequitable advantage of the 
other to his own enrichment and at the expense of the latter, a court of equity 
will extend its broad equitable powers to protect the party injured. 
Id. at 155,374 P.2d at 920 (quoting McKinzie v. Cline, 197 Or. 184, 195,252 P.2d 564, 
569 (1953)). 
151. . 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953). 
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gained knowledge of those secrets during the existence of a confi­
dential relationship. It concluded that a confidential relationship did 
exist between the parties: 
Here plaintiffs disclosed their design for one purpose, to enable 
defendant to appraise it with a view in mind of purchasing the 
business. There can be no question that defendant knew and 
understood this limited purpose. Trust was reposed in it by plain­
tiffs that the information thus transmitted would be accepted sub­
ject to that limitation. 152 
That the transactions with plaintiffs were at arms length did not, in 
the court's view, dictate a contrary result. "That fact," the court 
wrote, "does not detract from the conclusion that but for those very 
transactions defendant would not have learned, from plaintiffs, of 
the container design. The implied limitation on the use to be made 
of the infromation had its roots in the 'arms-length' transaction. "153 
Breach of a confidential relationship as an improper means of 
acquisition is most frequently invoked when an employee resigns, 
takes with him his former employer's trade secrets, and joins a 
competitor or establishes a competing business in which the trade 
secret is used. 154 It is frequently held that the employment rela­
tionship is confidential155 and that "[t]he existence of such relation­
ship between employer and employee imposes a duty upon the 
employee not to use or disclose the employer's confidential informa­
tion to the employer's detriment. "156 A confidential relationship will 
not arise, however, if the employee does not know that the informa­
tion is confidential and valuable. 157 As one commentator has ob­
152. [d. at 376. 
153. Id. at 377. 
154. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and 
Anti-Trust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1435 (1967); Klein, supra note 8, at 
452-54. 
155. See Harry R. Defler Corp. v. Kleeman, 19 App. Div. 2d 396, 401, 243 
N.Y.S.2d 930, 935 (1963), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 694, 225 N.E.2d 569, 278 N.Y.S.2d 
883 (1967); Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 200, 197 N.E. 217, 218 (1935); B. F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 500,192 N.E.2d 99,105 (1963); E. 
KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 46, at 151. But see National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 
409 S.W.2d 1, 35 (Mo. 1966). 
156. R. MILGRlM, supra note 8, § 5.02(1). 
157. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Guardian Glass Co., 322 F. Supp. 854, 
865 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 462 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.), cut. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 
(1972); National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 736, 79 
N.Y.S.2d 357, 361, app. denied, 274 App. Div. 822,81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1948). It should 
also be noted that there would be no breach of a confidential relationship if the 
employer had acquiesced in the taking of the trade secret. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 
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served: "There can be no betrayal of confidence unless there is a 
confidence to betray and it is known to be a confidence."158 Such 
knowledge can, of course, be found to exist on the ground that 
under the circumstances the employee has or should have reason to 
believe the information is confidential. 159 
Thus, in Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 160 one of the de­
fendants, Dobrowolski, who had been plaintiff's sales manager, left 
plaintiff to join another company. Plaintiff's company manufactured 
flavored and unflavored mouthguards. The company that hired 
defendant had never been in the mouthguard business, but within 
two weeks of Dobrowolski's arrival, it studied the product's poten­
tial. Subsequently, the company began to manufacture and market 
the mouthguard. Plaintiff claimed that Dobrowolski had knowl­
edge of his trade secrets concerning the production and sale of 
mouthguards, and that he was using them to benefit his new em­
ployer. The court held that the manufacturing technique was a trade 
secret which was disclosed to Dobrowolski. It was further deter­
mined that the disclosure was made in the course of a confidential 
relationship because the evidence, including Dobrowolski's own tes­
timony, established that he was aware of its confidential nature. The 
court therefore held that Dobrowolski had gained the trade secret 
through improper means. 161 
It is important to note that the employer does not lose his 
protection when the former employee reconstructs secret technical 
information from memory.162 Thus, in A.H. Emery Co. v. Marean 
Products Corp., 163 plaintiff charged that a former employee, Mills, 
had memorized its trade secrets regarding the design, construction, 
and manufacture of a hydraulic load cell, and then disclosed them to 
the defendant company. The trial court ruled that "it is as much a 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 403 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mich. 
1975); Metal Lubricants Co. v. Engineered Lubricants Co., 284 F. Supp. 483, 488-89 
(E.D. Mo. 1968), aII'd, 411 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1969). 
158. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 668 
(1960). 
159. A.H. Emery Co. v. Marean Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 16-17 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); R. MILGRlM, supra note 8, § 5.02(2). 
160. 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
161. See also Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D. 
Md. 1955), aII'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cen. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956); Schulen­
burg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cen. denied, 383 U.S. 959 
(1966); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493,192 N.E.2d 99 (1963). 
162. A. TURNER, supra note 29, at 169. 
163. 268 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aII'd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 
393 U.S. 835 (1968). 
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breach of confidence for an employee to reproduce his employer's 
drawings from memory as to copy them directly."164 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit affirmed, holding "that the information contained in 
its parts drawings, which had been reproduced from memory by 
[the draftsmen] for the use of the defendants, constituted protect­
able [sic] secrets. "165 Similarly, in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 166 
the defendants were charged with trade secret misappropriation. 
Their defense was that the trade secrets had been copied from 
memory. To this defense the court responded: 
It may be and if so, it was a remarkable display of memory, for 
numerous measurements were in thousandths of an inch. But it 
does not matter whether a copy of a Sperry drawing came out in a 
defendant's hand or in his head. His duty of fidelity to his em­
ployer remains the same. 167 
Finally, in Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton,168 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that even though no list or 
paper was taken, the former employee would be enjoined from dis­
closure if the information which he gained through his employment 
and retained in his memory is confidential in nature. 
The cases are less uniform, however, when the former em­
ployee memorizes and discloses secret customer listS. 169 A number 
of jurisdictions17o have adopted the Restatement of Agency test 
which prohibits an ex-employee from using or disclosing to com­
petitors his ex-employer's "written lists of names [although he 
or she is entitled to use] ... names of the customers retained in his 
memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent."l71 The 
majority of those courts that have squarely faced the issue, how­
ever, have rejected the Restatment view that no liability should 
be imposed where the customer list in question had been mem­
orized. 172 As one court has written: "Whether this information was 
164. 268 F. Supp. at 300. 
165. 389 F.2d at 15. 
166. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964). 
167. Id. at 563. 
168. 361 Mass. 835, 840, 282 N.E.2d 921, 924-25 (1972). 
169. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 46, at 156. 
170. See, e.g., Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S.W. 834 
(1925); E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at 342-43. 
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958). 
172. E.g., American Republic Ins. Co. v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 295 F. 
Supp. 553, 555 (D. Or. 1968); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 
624-25, 136 A.2d 838, 843 (1957). 
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embodied in written lists or committed to memory is, we believe, of 
no significance; in either case the data are entitled to protection. "173 
A third type of acquisition of trade secrets by improper means' 
occurs when the appropriation and use of secret information violates 
specific terms of a contract.I74 Many employers, for example, seek 
to keep their trade secrets from their competitors by executing em­
ployment contracts which contain covenants not to divulge secrets as 
well as covenants not to compete after termination of employment. 
Such covenants will be enforced so long as they do not unreasonably 
restrict the employee's mobility.175 Similarly, firms or individuals 
which must communicate trade secrets to parties such as customers, 
manufacturers, or suppliers in order to close business deals, often 
require the disclosee to contractually promise not to disclose the 
information. These contractual provisions are also generally upheld 
and enforced. 176 
C. Use of the Wrongfully Acquired Trade Secret 
Finally, plaintiff must establish either that the defendant has 
used or disclosed the wrongfully acquired trade secret or that there 
is a probability of improper disclosure or use to its detriment. 177 
Proving this element, as one federal judge has noted, can be "an 
173. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 624-25, 136 A.2d 
838, 843 (1957) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the merits of the "memory rule" 
as applied to customer lists, compare Blake, supra note 158, at 655-57, with Develop­
ments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 955-57 (1964); see also 
38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324, 343-47 (1963). 
174. See generally R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 3.01-.05. 
175. See, e.g., Durham v. Stand-by Labor of Georgia, Inc., 230 Ga. 55{3, 198 
S.E.2d 145 (1973), noted in 8 GA. L. REV. 527 (1974); Walker Cole and Ice Co. v. 
Westerman, 263 Mass. 235, 160 N.E. 801 (1928); 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, at 
§ 51.2(c). For an exhaustive collection of pre-1960 cases, see Blake, supra note 158, at 
625. For an update of the cases, see 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 29.9-29.26 (1973). Suffice it to say that what constitutes a reasonable 
restriction will vary among courts and the circumstances of the case. 
176. See, e.g., Compumarketing Servs. Corp. v. Business Envelope Mfrs., 342 F. 
Supp. 776 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Sinclair v. Aquarius Elec., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 
Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974); K & G Oil & Servo Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 
594,314 S.w.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958). 
177. Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th 
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Hagen, 363 F. Supp. 
1325 (w'D.N.Y. 1973); Klein v. Ekco Prods. Co., 135 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (Sup. Ct. 1954); 
R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.05. One commentator has stated the basis for this 
requirement as follows: "In the law of torts there is the maxim: Every dog has one free 
bite. A dog cannot be presumed to be vicious until he has proved that he is by biting 
someone. As with a dog, the [plaintiff] may have to wait for the [defendant] to commit 
some overt act before he can act." R. ELLIS, supra note 29, § 85. 
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extraordinarily difficult task"178 since direct evidence is usually very 
difficult to obtain. 
In most cases plaintiffs must construct a web of perhaps ambigu­
ous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw 
inferences which convince him that it is more probable than not 
that what plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place. Against 
this often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence there fre­
quently must be balanced defendants and defendants' witnesses 
who directly deny everything. 179 
One form of circumstantial evidence that is frequently relied on 
to establish use is "similarity. "180 Thus, for example, in a case in 
which it is charged that defendant wrongfully acquired and used 
plaintiff's secret blueprints for manufacturing a certain product, the 
similarity of defendant's product to plaintiff's is sufficient proof that 
defendant used plaintiff's trade secret. 181 The theory behind such 
a holding is simply that "it is hardly probable that different persons 
should independently of each other invent devices so nearly similar 
at so nearly the same time. "182 The similarity between the products 
need not be identical. Substantial similarity will suffice,183 although 
proof of some congruence will not by itself support a finding of 
use. 184 The requisite degree of similarity will ordinarily be a ques­
tion of fact. 
Likewise, evidence that an employee, who has access to his 
or her firm's trade secrets, has left the firm and joined a competing 
company, and that shortly afterwards that company has begun to 
manufacture and sell a product that incorporates these trade se­
178. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974) 
(Lord, C.J.). 
179. Id. 
180. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 377 (7th Cir. 1953); Hoeltke v. C. M. 
Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir.), cerl. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1935); Greenberg v. 
Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974); cf. Kelite Corp. v. Khem 
Chems., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 332, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1958) (fonnulae of defendant's products 
"close enough" to plaintiff's formulae "to rebut the contention of coincidence or 
independent discovery"). 
181. Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 169 (D. Conn.), mod­
ified, 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 
232 Or. 139, 156,374 P.2d 912, 920-21 (1962). 
182. Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 924 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
298 U.S. 673 (1935). 
183. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971); Riteoff, 
Inc. v. Contact Indus., Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 731,350 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1973). 
184. See National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966); R. MIL­
GRIM, supra note 8, § 7.07(1)(a). 
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crets establish the element of use. 185 Thus, in Weil-McLain Co., 
Inc. v. Andro COrp.,186 Andro Corporation charged that Weil-Mc­
Lain had wrongfully appropriated its trade secrets. Andro alleged 
that it had employed one Dieter Grether as its Manager of En­
gineering for several years, and that during this time he had ac­
quired knowledge of trade secrets relating to the manufacture of 
heating and air conditioning systems. Mter Grether quit and went to 
work for Weil-McLain, that company began to manufacture a line of 
products identical in many respects to Andro's. The court held that 
when a high-level employee with access to a firm's trade secrets is 
hired by a competing firm which then markets a product incorporat­
ing those secrets, proof of use is present. 187 
Regardless of similarity or change of employment by key em­
ployees, proof of non-copying or independent development of the 
trade secret will bar liability. 188 This defense can be established by 
showing that defendant's employees who developed the trade secret 
never had access to the allegedly misappropriated information. 189 It 
can also be established by proof that experimentation prior to the 
hiring of plaintiff's former employee led to the development of the 
trade secret. 190 
185. Weil-McLain Co. v. Andro Corp., [1976-1977] PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. 
No. 333 at A-16 (BNA) (N.D.N.Y. 1977). Cj. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Ameri­
can Potash & Chern. Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 533,200 A.2d 428 (1964); B.F. Goodrich Co. 
v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493,192 N.E.2d 99 (1963) (both cases involving threat 
of use or disclosure). 
186. [1976-77] PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. No. 333 at A-16 (BNA) (N.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
187. Id. at A-16 and A-17. 
188. Speedry Chern. Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 333-34 (2d 
Cir. 1962); Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1971); 
Szczesny v. W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Corp., 20 Ill. App. 3d 607, 614,315 
N.E.2d 263, 268 (1974); cj. Teich v. General Mills, Inc., 170 Cal. App. 2d 791, 339 
P.2d 627 (1959) (subject matter of appropriation was an idea). See also Whelan, Trade 
Secrets-Problems of Acquisition, 18 Bus. LAW. 539, 542 (1963). As to the defendant's 
burden of proof in this regard, compare Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 
923 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1935) (defendant must come forward with 
evidence of an independently developed device that is "clear, satisfactory, and 
beyond a reasonable doubt") with Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 
806,815 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (evidence of use of plaintiff's trade secret can be overcome by 
a "showing" that the trade secret was developed independently). Cj. Szczesny v. 
W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Corp., 20 Ill. App. 3d 607, 315 N.E.2d263 (1974) (on 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, defense of independent development will 
prevail only upon a showing of compelling proof). 
189. Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972). 
190. ld. See also Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 
1974) (court recognized defense of prior experimentation but did not believe tes­
timony of key defense witness). 
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In cases in which the defendant has not used the plaintiff's 
trade secret, plaintiff, to obtain an injunction, must show a substan­
tial threat of use by the defendant. 191 As with proof of a completed 
use or disclosure, this burden of proof can be met by circumstantial 
evidence. 192 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth 193 illustrates this 
point. Donald Wohlgemuth, while employed by plaintiffB.F. Good­
rich worked on the design and construction of certain space suits 
for Project Mercury. He quit his job and took a higher paid position 
with a competitor of Goodrich, International Latex Corporation, 
which had recently been awarded a research and development con­
tract for space suits for Project Apollo. Plaintiff sued to enjoin 
Wohlgemuth from revealing any of its trade secrets to his new em­
ployer. In issuing an injunction, the court observed that there was 
"no evidence . . . that Goodrich trade secrets have been revealed 
by Wohlgemuth; however, the circumstances surrounding his em­
ployment by Latex, and his own attitude as revealed by statements 
to fellow Goodrich employees, are sufficient to satisfY this court that 
a substantial threat of disclosure exists. "194 
When a trade secret is used by one who has acquired it in good 
faith without knowledge that the person from whom it was obtained 
had acquired the trade secret improperly, liability will not be im­
posed. 195 But once the innocent user is put on notice that the trade 
secret had been wrongfully obtain.ed, use must cease. 196 The Re­
191. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.07(1)(d) (collecting cases). Mere suspicion 
that the defendant will use it is not enough. Id. 
192. Filter Dynamics Int'!, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 316, 
311 N.E.2d 386, 399 (1974). 
193. 117 Ohio App. 493,192 N.E.2d 99 (1963). 
194. Id. at 499, 192 N.E.2d at 104-05. 
195. Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th 
Cir. 1953),.cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954). See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ 758 (1939); R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 5.04(2)(a). While claimed innocent use may 
easily be interposed, circumstantial evidence may be introduced in rebuttal. Id. 
§ 5.04(2)(c). Such a claim is frequently made by corporations who (1) hire new 
employees to acquire their ex-employer's trade secrets, (2) in fact utilize them and 
then, when sued by the ex-employer for trade secret misappropriation, argue that they 
did not know the employees were breaking a confidential relationship when they 
brought such trade secrets with them to their new employer. The cases show that this 
defense will rarely succeed. Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 
557 (D. Md. 1955), afI'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956); 
Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. 
denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954); Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1970). 
196. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 
1949); Whiting Milk Co. v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E. 379 (1933). See also 
R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 5.04(2)(d). 
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statement of Torts, it should be noted, takes a more relaxed posi­
tion. It would bar liability even after notice if the user is a bona fide 
purchaser or "has so changed his position that to subject him to 
liability would be inequitable. "197 
III. REMEDIES 
Remedies available for the misappropriation of trade secrets 
include equitable relief and monetary damages. 19B In appropriate 
cases, a court may order both equitable and legal relief.199 Since 
misappropriation of trade secrets is an intentional tort, a court has 
broad discretion to fashion such relief as will best compensate the 
plaintiff for the harm suffered. 20o Every trade secret case thus re­
quires a flexible and imaginative approach to the issue of relief. 
Counsel for plaintiff should adjust his or her request for relief to ac­
cord with the commercial setting of the injury, the likely future 
consequences of the misappropriation, and the nature and extent of 
defendant's use of the trade secret after the misappropriation. 
A. EqUitable Relief 
1. Injunctions 
Injunctive relief to prohibit use of the trade secret as well as 
disclosure to others is the remedy most commonly sought in trade 
secret cases. 201 As in other contexts, the prerequisites for injunctive 
relief are a showing of irreparable harm in the absence of such relief 
and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. 202 In most instances, these 
197. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 (1939). See also Walters v. Shari Music 
Publishing Corp., 185 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), complaint dismissed on jurisdic­
tional groullds, 193 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal dismissed conditionally, 298 
F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1962). 
198. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment e (1939); OPPENHEIM & WES­
TON, supra note 8, at 308. 
199. Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert. 
dellied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956). 
200. Telex Corp. V. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 931-33 (10th Cir.), cert. dis­
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). 
201. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 591, 314 S.W.2d 763, 780, cert. 
dellied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); National Tile Board Corp. v. Panelboard Mfg. Co., 27 N.J. 
Super. 348, 355, 99 A.2d 440, 443 (Ch. Div. 1953); E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 
46, at 221; Annot., 170 A.L.R. 449, 488-89 (1942). This is understandable since in most 
instances the immediate priority of the party whose trade secret has been misappro­
priated will be to enjoin any further use or disclosure of the trade secret. Thus, as a 
matter of course, injunctive relief should be sought. 
202. American Dirigold Corp. V. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 452 (6th 
Cir. 1942); Digital Dev. Corp. v. International Memory Sys., 185 U.S.P.Q. 136 (BNA) 
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criteria will be deemed satisfied once it has been established that a 
trade secret has been wrongfully acquired. 203 
Debate usually centers on the scope rather than the availability 
of injunctive relief. The general rule is that an injunction should be 
tailored to meet the requirements of the particular case. It should be 
neither excessively broad nor unduly restrictive. 204 Accordingly, the 
courts will attempt "to put the aggrieved party in trade secret cases 
in as good a position as he would have enjoyed had the misappro­
priation not occurred. "205 
Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
CO.,206 provides a striking illustration of the rule as applied to the 
issue of the duration of the injunction. The Mincom Division of the 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (Mincom), had de­
veloped an improved precision tape recorder and reproducer. Sub­
sequently, Winston Research Corporation (Winston) developed a 
similar product. The lower court found that Winston had drawn on 
Mincom's trade secrets which it had acquired by hiring several of 
that firm's employees. The court enjoined Winston from disclosing 
or using Mincom's trade secrets for two years from the date of entry 
of the court's judgment. On appeal, Mincom argued that the injunc­
tion should have been permanent or at least remained in effect for a 
much longer period. Winston, on the other hand, contended that no 
injunctive relief was appropriate. The Ninth Circuit rejected both 
arguments and affirmed the lower court's order with only slight 
modifications. It reasoned that a permanent injunction would sub­
vert public policy which encourages technical employees to make 
full use of their skill and seeks to foster research and development, 
but that denial of relief would reward unfair practices. Thus, a mid­
dle ground was appropriate. 
By enjoining use of the trade secrets for the approximate period it 
would require a legitimate Mincom competitor to develop a suc­
cessful machine after public disclosure of the secret information, 
(S.D. Cal. 1973). As to the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, see generally 
Berryhill, Trade Secret Litigation: Injunctions and Other Equitable Remedies, 48 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 189, 201-04 (1976). 
203. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 
958 (1964). 
204. Spiseiman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 551, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141, 
appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 921, 62 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1946); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7, 
131-35 (1969); 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions § 297 (1969); Berryhill, supra note 202, 
at 204. 
205. Hawkiand, supra note 25, at 130. 
206. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965). 
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the district court denied the employees any advantage from their 
faithlessness, placed Mincom in the position it would have oc­
cupied if the breach of confidence had not occurred prior to the 
public disclosure, and imposed the minimum restraint consistent 
with the realization of these objectives upon the utilization of the 
employees' skills. 207 
A number of decisions have employed a similar rationale in issuing 
injunctions that are of limited duration. 208 
Other courts, however, have not taken such a balanced ap­
proach. Thus, in Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 209 the 
court held that a defendant may be permanently enjoined from 
using a misappropriated trade secret even after it has become pub­
lic knowledge and others are thus entitled to use it. The rationale is 
that the defendant, having acted wrongfully, should be deprived of 
the right now available to everyone else. 210 This view has been 
followed in a number of other cases. 211 Conversely, some courts 
have held that permanent injunctions may issue but that they shall 
automatically end when the trade secret becomes available to the 
public. 212 
Courts and commentators alike appear to support the position 
taken by Winston and its progeny: injunctions in trade secret cases 
should remain in effect long enough to remedy the wrong, but no 
longer. 213 Since this standard requires the factfinder to determine 
how long it would have taken the defendant to duplicate the plain­
tifrs process or product, counsel for either party must be prepared 
to present evidence on this point. The period of time will, of course, 
207. Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted). 
208. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974); Plant Indus., 
Inc. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
209. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937). 
210. Id. at 1l0. 
211. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); A. O. Smith Corp. v. 
Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 
1935); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or. 139, 374 P.2d 912 (1962); Elcor Chern. Corp. v. 
Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 
566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958). 
212. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 
1949) (Hood, J.); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, 
supplemented, 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965). The 
Shellmar, supra note 209, and Conmar, supra, doctrines are discussed in A. TURNER, 
supra note 49, at 427-28. 
213. A. TURNER, supra note 49, at 454; T. ARNOLD, Problems in Trade Secret 
Law, 1961-62 ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT SECTION PROCEEDINGS 
248,258-60 (1961); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
888,958-59 (1964); cases cited in note 208, supra. 
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vary depending on the facts of each case. It may be a year or less or, 
if the evidence shows that the trade secret could not have been 
independently developed, a permanent injunction may issue. 214 
Where the misappropriation suit arises out of a breach of a 
covenant not to use or disclose an employer's trade secret for a 
specified period of time after termination of employment and the 
time period specified in the covenant has run prior to the entry of 
judgment, the courts are divided as to the availability of injunctive 
relief.215 Thus, in Abalene Pest Control Service, Inc. v. Hall,216 
plaintiff sued one of its ex-employees to enforce a covenant which 
provided that for a period of five years following termination of 
employment he would not disclose customer information, and for a 
period of two years he would not compete with his employer. By the 
time the case was argued in the Vermont Supreme Court, the two 
year period had run. Although the court enforced the five year 
provisions of the covenant, it dismissed as moot that part of the suit 
which sought to enforce the two year provision despite defendant's 
continuous violation while the covenant had been in effect. One 
commentator has criticized the view that "rights already lost and 
wrongs already committed are not remediable by injunction. . . . 
[S]uch a rationale ignores the purpose for having these contractual 
provisions in the first place, thwarts the compensatory goal of the 
injunctive remedy, and foments . . . ineffective litigation in the 
form of separate actions for breach of contract. "217 . 
On the other hand, when breach of a covenant not to compete 
for two years following termination of employment was challenged 
in Premier Industrial Corp. v. Texas Industrial Fastener CO.,218 the 
court held that the employee could be enjoined from working for a 
period of fourteen months from the date of final judgment, even 
though the injunction would not end until approximately three years 
beyond the date on which the employee quit. This extension was 
necessary in order to protect the plaintiff's "right to enjoyment of its 
injunctive relief for a meaningful period of time . . . . "219 Other 
courts have followed this approach,220 which resembles that taken in 
214. See T. Arnold, Rights ill Trade Secrets That Are Not Secret, 1963 S.W. 
LEGAL FOUNDATION 1st INST. ON PAT. LAW 135-36. 
215. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(l)(a). 
216.126 Vt. 1, 220 A.2d 717 (1966). 
217. Berryhill, supra note 202, at 207-08 (footnote omitted). 
218. 450 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1971). 
219. [d. at 448. 
220. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 
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Winston in its attempt to frame a balanced injunctive decree which 
truly seeks to make the plaintiff whole. 
Another interesting question that has arisen about the scope of 
injunctive relief is whether a court can enjoin the defendant from 
continuing to engage in the same line of business in competition 
with plaintiff after misappropriation of a trade secret has been 
proved. The answer appears to be "no." While there can be no 
doubt that a court will enjoin the defendant from manufacturing a 
product which embodies the trade secret or is produced by using 
it,221 the courts will not on the basis of misappropriation alone pro­
hibit the defendant from continuing in that business. 222 He or she is 
to produce the product using other methods or processes. This re­
sult recognized that "[t]he injunctive relief should be restricted to 
the benefits flowing from the ... [improper acquisition]. "223 
In sum, the case law recognizes that injunctive relief in trade 
secret cases is not guided by rigid rules. To the contrary, the formu­
lation of injunctive relief will turn in most cases upon a full consider­
ation of all the surrounding circumstances, guided by the consider­
ation that relief must be tailored to accomplish remedial and not 
criminal purposes. 
2. Other Equitable Relief 
Additional equitable remedies which the courts have decreed 
include an order for the return of the trade secret and copies thereof 
when physically feasible,224 and destruction of the products man­
ufactured through the use of the trade secret along with the equip­
ment used by the defendant in the manufacturing process. 225 The 
scope of such relief also turns upon the circumstances of each case. 
223 (1st CiT. 1973); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 352, 226 N.E.2d 624 
(1967); cf. Sanitary Fann Dairies, Inc. v. Wolf, 261 Minn. 166, 112 N.W.2d 42 (1961) 
(plaintiff entitled to injunction for length of time sufficient to allow him to compete on 
even tenns with ex-employee who solicited customers while still in plaintiff's 
employ). 
221. Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958); R. MIL­
GRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(I)(b) (collecting cases); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 572 (1971) (col­
lecting cases). 
222. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); R. MILGRIM, supra note 
8, § 7.08(1)(b). 
223. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 378 (7th CiT. 1953). 
224. General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 50 Misc. 2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 
modified, 52 Misc. 2d 197,274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. 
Standard Steel Car Co., 219 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904); R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, 
§ 7.08(4)(a). 
225. General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 50 Misc. 2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 
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For example, destruction of all equipment will usually be decreed 
when the defendant may continue to use the trade secret or sell the 
product embodying it despite the existence of an injunction. 
Likewise, an order for the destruction of equipment may issue when 
it appears that defendant may flee the jurisdiction. ~26 Destruction 
will not be decreed, however, when the equipment is usable in 
other manufacturing activities. 227 
B. Monetary Damages 
1. Compensatory Damages 
It is clear that compensatory damages may be awarded in trade 
secret misappropriation cases. 228 The two basic measures of recov­
ery include the losses sustained by plaintiff and the profits earned by 
defendant through the use of the misappropriated trade secret. 229 In 
most instances, plaintiff may recover under either theory, but not 
both,' for otherwise there would be a double recovery.230 However, 
recovery under both theories is not precluded when the circum­
stances so require it to make the plaintiff whole. 231 Regardless of the 
method employed, plaintiff has the burden of proving damages. 232 
Damages must be more than merely speculative, although mathe­
modified, 52 Misc. 2d 197, 274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Contra, American Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 F. 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888). 
226. See Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HARV. L. REV. 976, 982 
(1951); Comment, 35 MICH. L. REv. 1350 (1937). 
227. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 378 (7th Cir. 1953). 
228. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal 
denied, 270 App. Div. 921, 62 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1946). 
229. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). See also 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 59.3; R. 
ELLIS, supra 29, § 287; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 746, 747 (1938). The first 
method is commonly referred to as the traditional common law remedy, and the sec­
ond as an equitable remedy which treats the defendant as trustee ex maleficio for the 
victim of the wrongdoer's gains from his wrongdoing. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, 
Inc., 447 F.2d at 1392. 
230. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Consolidated Boiler Corp. v. Bogue Elec. Co., 141 N.J. 
Eq. 550,58 A.2d 759 (1948); R. ELLIS, supra note 29, § 287. 
231. Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1975); Telex Corp. v. 
I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Clark v. 
Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972). 
232. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(3)(c). Plaintiff must, of course, establish 
that the damages he seeks to recover are a direct result of the defendant's misappro­
priation. See Runiks v. Peterson, 155 Colo. 47,392 P.2d 590 (1964). 
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matical precision is not necessary.233 A rational evidentiary basis 
for a given damage claim will usually suffice. 234 . 
a. Losses Sustained 
The most obvious example of losses sustained by a plaintiff is 
profits lost as a result of the misappropriation. For example, the 
defendant's misappropriation of the trade secret may have enabled it 
to displace plaintiff's product in the market sooner than would 
otherwise have been the case. As a consequence, plaintiff may have 
sold fewer products and suffered a loss of profits. In such a case, 
damages may be calculated on the basis of those lost profits.235 If the 
misappropriation precludes the plaintiff from manufacturing or mar­
keting its product, the same reasoning should similarly support the 
recovery of lost profits. In this context, the net profits generally 
recoverable are computed by subtracting any costs which have been 
avoided from lost revenues. 236 This measure, however, does include 
certain fixed overhead costS.237 
Plaintiff's recovery is not limited to lost profits. The cases indi­
cate that costs incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the misappro­
priation are also recoverable. 238 Thus, if the misappropriation has 
led to increased manufacturing costs or added training expenses for 
personnel, the total amount of such expenditures can be recov­
ered. 239 
233. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Morton v. Rogers, 20 Ariz. App. 581, 586, 514 P.2d 752, 757 
(1973). 
234. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Sigma Sys. Corp., 500 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). 
235. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 931 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 
232 Or. 139, 157,374 P.2d 912, 921 (1962). Plaintiff's loss of profits may also include 
the profits he or she could reasonably have expected from follow-up sales of spares or 
parts to supplement the basic product. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 
1387 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). .. 
236. See generally Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedure in Unfair Com­
petition Cases, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 431 (1946); 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 336 (1956). 
237. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 748, Comment i (1938); Sperry Rand Corp. v. 
A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1394 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S: 1017 (1972); 
Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 400-03 (D. Md. 1963); 
American Elecs., Inc. v. Neptune Meter Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 117, 290N.Y.S.2d 333 
(1968). 
238. See Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir.), cert. dis­
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). 
239. D. BOIES, DAMAGES FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS 231 
( 1975). 
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b. Defendant's Gain 
When plaintiff is unable to prove specific injury, the appro­
priate measure of damages is the benefits, profits, or advantages 
gained by the defendant in the use of the misappropriated trade 
secret. 240 The cases reveal many variations in the way this benefit to 
the defendant can be computed. Counsel should consider each 
standard and then determine which is best suited to his client's case. 
The first method is to measure the defendant's profits attribut­
able to its use of the trade secret. 241 In most instances only the 
defendant's actual profits can be considered; speculations and esti­
mates must be excluded. 242 Plaintiff is only entitled to net profits; 
the defendant may deduct the expenses that relate to the new prod­
uct despite the use of plaintiff's trade secret. Deduction for recur­
ring general and administrative expenses, however, is not al­
lowed. 243 
When no actual profits exist or their determination is impracti­
cal, another method referred to as the "reasonable royalty;' may be 
used for purposes of assessing damages. 244 A reasonable royalty is 
that amount which the trier of fact estimates that a party would be 
willing to pay for use of the trade secret and the owner would be 
willing to accept.245 In calculating what a fair licensing price would 
240. International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d 
Cir. 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate­
Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Md. 1963). 
241. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 
(5th Cir. 1974). Generally, a judicial accounting is ordered to determine the amount of 
profits. Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1433, 1437-38 (1959). 
242. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940); 
Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1433, 1437-38 (1959). 
243. See Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540, 553-54 (Mo. 1970); Annot., 63 
A.L.R.2d 1433 (1959). 
244. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 
536-42 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing cases); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 
627 (7th Cir. 1971). The rationale for resort to another standard when profits cannot be 
determined was aptly described in Lykes-Youngstown, as follows: 
[T]he risk of defendants' venture, using the misappropriated secret, should 
not be placed on the injured plaintiff, but rather the defendants must bear the 
risk of failure themselves. Accordingly the law looks to the time at which the 
misappropriation occurred to determine what the value of the misappro­
priated secret would be to a defendant who believes he can utilize it to his 
advantage, provided he does in fact put the idea to a commercial use. 
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d at 536 (footnote 
omitted). 
245. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536­
38 (5th Cir. 1974). For discussion of the reasonable royalty standard in patent infringe­
ment cases, which is used by analogy in trade secret cases, see Foster v. American 
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have been had the parties agreed, the factfinder should consider 
such variables as foreseeable changes in the parties' competitive 
positions; the price past purchasers or licensees may have paid; the 
total value of the secret to the plaintiff, including the plaintiff's 
development costs and the importance of the secret to the plaintiffs 
business; the nature and extent of the use the defendant intended 
for the secret; and whatever other unique factors in the particular 
case, such as the ready availability of alternative processes, may 
have affected the parties' agreement. 246 That the plaintiff had in the 
past refused to license the trade secret, and thus is unable to intro­
duce past transactions as evidence of the terms of a reasonable 
license agreement, does not preclude' the use of this standard. 247 
A third approach to the determination of defendant's cost sav­
ings as a result of the misappropriation is frequently called the 
'~standard of comparison test. "248 This standard "contemplates a 
comparison of the costs incurred by the defendant using the . . . 
trade secret, and the costs that would have been incurred had he not 
used the trade secret. The difference between the two is thE: 'bene­
fit' accruing to the defendant, and is the measure of plaintiff; s dam­
ages. "249 
Using the defendant's gain as the measure of damages is a most 
significant standard since it can be computed in various ways. Coun­
sel should not overlook the possibilities it affords for making the 
plaintiff whole. 
Machine & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974); 
Hughes Tool Co. v. C. W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 491 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1973); Note, 
Recovery ill Patellt Illfringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 848-49 (1960); Fink, 
The New Measure of Damages ill Patellt Cases, 29 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 822 (1947); 
Wolff, The Measure of Damages ill Patellt Illfrillgemellt Actiolls Ullder the Act of 
August 1,1946,28 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 877 (1946). 
246. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 
538-39 (5th Cir. 1974). 
247. ld. at 542-43. 
248. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
423 U.S. 802 (1975); International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 
696,699 (3d Cir. 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958). 
249. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
423 U.S. 802 (1975). At least one court has considered the plaintiff's actual develop­
ment costs as the measure of damages under this standard. The court, however, noted 
that such measurement would be inadequate in most instances because it would not 
take into account the commercial context in which the misappropriation occurred. 
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 538 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
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2. Punitive Damages 
Although punitive damages are not generally favored by the 
law,250 recent trade secret decisions have allowed them in appro­
priate cases. 251 This trend has become so marked that one commen­
tator has observed that "[i]f your goal in business tort litigation is to 
obtain a maximum recovery for your client, you will fall short of that 
objective if you overlook the possibility of collecting punitive dam­
ages."252 
While the law controlling when punitive damages will be im­
posed varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most courts will assess 
three fundamental factors: The character of the defendant's conduct, 
the extent and nature of the harm to the plaintiff caused or intended 
by the defendant, and the wealth of the defendant. 253 Expressed 
another way, the courts look to see whether the defendant's conduct 
is "flagran t. "254 
3. Attorney's Fees as Damages 
The cases differ on the question of whether a successful plaintiff 
may recover attorney's fees. 255 Although some courts have noted the 
general policy of both state and federal courts not to award such fees 
in the absence of an agreement or statutory authorization,256 others 
will nevertheless make such an award. 257 Accordingly, counsel 
should investigate whether the state where suit is brought permits 
recovery of attorney's fees to a successful plain tiff. 
250. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958). 
251. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Sperry Rand Corp. 
v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Carter 
Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md. 1963); Southern Cal. 
Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960). 
252. Galane, Provillg PUllitive Damages ill Busilless Tort Litigatioll, LITIGA­
TION, Spring 1976 at 24. 
253. Id. The Galane article is highly recommended because of its thorough dis­
cussion of all aspects of punitive damages. 
254. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
423 U.S. 802 (1975). 
255. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(3)(e) (collecting cases). 
256. Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp., 502 F.2d 802 
(9th Cir. 1974); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971). 
257. Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md. 
1963); Irving Iron Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 702, 126 A. 291 
(1924). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Protecting trade secrets has assumed considerable importance 
in today's corporate· world. Cognizant of the role that confidential 
business information plays in the competitive market, businesses are 
making substantial investments of time and money to guard against 
the loss of such information. Nevertheless, despite the most strin­
gent internal security programs, misappropriation does occur. When 
this happens, the injured firm must turn to the courts for relief. 
This article attempts to provide guidelines for the practitioner 
who is unfamiliar with the subject of trade secret misappropriation. 
A careful and informed approach is necessary to litigation in this 
area. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he lawyer cannot and 
should not regard a trade secret problem as just another tort 
case. "258 Such litigation presents a host of challenging problems 
regarding the elements of liability that must be established together 
with the proof that will satisfY such elements. 
Though no one particular theory of liability for trade secret 
.misappropriation has evolved in American legal thought, proof of 
three elements is essential to establish liability. First, plaintiff must 
show the existence of a trade secret. This requires proof that: (1) The 
trade secret is protectible subject matter; (2) it is not common 
knowledge throughout the trade; (3) efforts have been made to main­
tain secrecy; and (4) it is of.some value to plaintiff. Second, it must 
be shown that a third party acquired the secret by improper conduct 
or unfair means. Third, that use or disclosure of the trade secret by 
that party will be to the owner's detriment must be shown. 
Although not essential to establishing liability, the form of relief 
should be thoroughly examined by counsel. The commercial setting 
of the injury, the probable future consequences of the misappropria­
tion, and the nature and extent of defendant's use of the trade secret 
must be assessed when drafting a request for relief which will best 
compensate plaintiff for the injury. 
While many of the practical problems that arise have been dis­
cussed, it is evident that others remain. In attempting to resolve 
these problems, the attorney should consider the four competing 
interests and demands that have shaped trade secret misappropria­
tion law. They are: 
(1) The interests, demands and claims of an enterprise which by 
costly research and experiment has developed information, inven­
258. Berryhill, supra note 202, at 189. 
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tions, skills and knowledge, e.g., know-how, that gives to such 
enterprises an advantageous competitive position in the market 
place. This is a valuable business asset for the acquisition of which 
other enterprises are willing to pay a price and the unauthorized 
disclosure or misuse by others would inflict a serious damage to 
the originating enterprise. 
(2) The interests, demands and claims of competing enterprises 
which desire to obtain the benefit of know-how developed by 
others as an effective instrument for the promotion of their inter­
ests. They are looking out for the publication of any information 
on such know-how and desire to enter into agreements to obtain 
communication of know-how maintained in secrecy. 
(3) The interests and claims of the community in the widest 
possible intercommunication of know-how by enterprises and the 
resulting high quality standards and low cost of goods, and in the 
avoidance of undue or excessive restraints between those compet­
ing in the market place. 
(4) The interests of the social and legal order of the country 
concerned which would be fatally injured if the spirit of invention 
and creation and the investment in research and development of 
know-how was to be discouraged, and if it would be permitted to 
enterprises to engage in unlawful competition and unauthorized 
use of secret know-how of others, or in the disinclination to share 
technical knowledge and skills. 259 
Although they will not provide the attorney with conclusive an­
swers, analyzing a specific problem in light of these interests will at 
least indicate the approach that a court might deem the most equita­
ble under the circumstances. This will enable the practitioner to 
better determine the likelihood of success when presented with a 
potential trade secret misappropriation case. 
259. Ladas, Legal Protectioll of Kllow-How, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 160, 166 
(1964). 
